Reserve soldier killed, Iron Dome battery hit as Hezbollah’s FPV drones continue to confound Israeli military

An additional IDF soldier was killed on Sunday, and three more were wounded the following day, as the Israeli military’s ongoing efforts to counter Hezbollah’s first-person view (FPV) drone attacks continued over the past several days.

First Sergeant (res.) Alexander Glovanyov (47) was the fifth Israeli casualty during the ceasefire linked to the use of cheap, hard-to-detect drones, killed when a Hezbollah drone struck the tank carrier he was driving near the border.

According to Army Radio, several drones used in the attack were undetected by air defenses, leaving Glovanyov with no time to evade. Within less than 24 hours, three additional IDF soldiers were lightly wounded when another FPV drone exploded near them in southern Lebanon.

An IDF reservist was killed in a Hezbollah drone attack in northern Israel yesterday, the military announces.

The slain soldier is named as Warrant Officer (res.) Alexander Glovanyov, 47, a driver in the Transport Center's 6924th Battalion, from Petah Tikva.

During the attack,… pic.twitter.com/jfTIIaVyQ3

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) May 11, 2026

Another drone reportedly struck an IDF Iron Dome battery, a highly significant strike marking a landmark success for Hezbollah’s new strategy.

The terror group released footage of the strike on Sunday, and Army Radio reported that the military is investigating, though the IDF has not officially confirmed the incident.

Hezbollah’s footage claims the strike took place last Thursday, with a follow-up attack reportedly targeting soldiers who were repairing the same battery the following day.

"הוא מגיע בשקט, אנחנו חשופים": תיעוד - רחפן נפץ של חיזבאללה פוגע במערכת כיפת ברזל@ela1949 pic.twitter.com/XPYdfvb6RE

— כאן חדשות (@kann_news) May 10, 2026

A recent report in The Marker alleged that part of the problem stems from the lack of preparedness by the IDF’s Close Air Support (Rokar) branch, and that there is no particular office responsible for anti-drone systems within MAFAT (Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure) at the Defense Ministry. 

Several entrepreneurs involved in drone warfare research told the news outlet that they had approached the IDF and Defense Ministry with new systems developed after the Ukraine war exposed the threat posed by fiber-optic cable-controlled FPV drones, but said neither showed sustained interest.

“The only thing that surprises me is how much time Hezbollah needed to develop the use of this threat. I thought it would happen much earlier,” one entrepreneur said.

“The Defense Ministry has already developed much more complex systems than those required to deal with these drones,” he continued. “There is technological maturity in Israel for at least half of this solution – at least for the level of drone detection – that would allow soldiers to know that drones are approaching them. Awareness solves 80% of the problem, because our soldiers are good and skilled and will know how to take cover.”

According to Army Radio, the IDF identified an increased focus by Hezbollah on developing explosive drone capabilities toward the end of the “Northern Arrows” campaign in 2024. The group is said to have used the subsequent ceasefire period to significantly expand these capabilities, including acquiring drones and training operators.

In June 2025, a wave of strikes across Lebanon targeted a large number of Hezbollah’s drone and UAV production workshops.

The IDF estimates that the group only has about 100 qualified FPV drone operators, who require training to control the aircraft via the fiber-optic cable. It has, therefore, identified the limited number of operators as a weak link and attempted to target them; however, it has only managed to kill between 5 and 10 so far.

“It’s not enough,” a senior officer told Army Radio. “We are making technological and intelligence efforts to locate the drone operators – and strike them. Their number is finite – they are the bottleneck.”

The fiber-optic cable is only between 10 and 15 km (6 to 9 miles) long, forcing most operators to work from the area south of the Litani River but outside the IDF’s control. The military also doesn’t rule out the possibility that some drones are being operated from within the IDF-controlled areas, particularly those that reach deep into Israeli territory.