What remains of the Oslo Accords?

Whether recent Israeli administrative measures regarding land registration and planning authority in Area C of the West Bank, as well as security operations conducted since October 2023, constitute violations of the Oslo Accords and international law, or whether such actions are lawful exercises of sovereign authority, interim administrative powers, and inherent rights of self-defense in response to material breaches by Palestinian factions.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. The Oslo Accords are not a sovereignty agreement but a framework for interim self-governance. They explicitly reserve sovereignty over disputed territories for permanent status negotiations. Israel retains all sovereign powers not specifically transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA) .

2. Area C remains under full Israeli jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Oslo II Accord (1995), until a permanent agreement is reached, Israel retains full powers over security, planning, and land registration in Area C. Recent administrative actions are lawful exercises of these reserved powers .

3. Material breach by Palestinian side. The PA and other factions have failed to fulfill core security obligations, including combating terrorist infrastructure, preventing incitement, and dismantling militant groups. These breaches release Israel from reciprocal obligations under the rebus sic stantibus principle and the law of treaties .

4. Right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The unprecedented terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, originating from territory controlled by Hamas, triggered Israel’s inherent right to individual and collective self-defense. Operations in Gaza and preventative actions in the West Bank are lawful responses to ongoing threats .

5. Sovereign right to manage state land. The registration of land as "state property" in Area C is an administrative act consistent with Ottoman Land Law and British Mandate regulations, preserved by Israeli law. It does not constitute "annexation" but rather the lawful determination of tenure pending final status .

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. THE OSLO ACCORDS: AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK, NOT A FINAL STATUS SETTLEMENT

To assess the legality of Israel's recent actions, one must first correctly interpret the legal nature of the Oslo Accords. The Declaration of Principles (Oslo I, 1993) and the Interim Agreement (Oslo II, 1995) were explicitly designed as interim arrangements. As noted in the factual background, the goal was a permanent status agreement by 1999, but that goal was never realized due to successive failures by the Palestinian side to meet fundamental conditions.

A. The Reservation of Sovereignty
The Oslo Accords operate on a principle of "reserved rights." Article I of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and subsequent documents establish that the Palestinian Authority is a self-governing administrative body, not a sovereign state. The PLO recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism, and in exchange, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Critically, sovereignty over the territory—including the West Bank—was not transferred. It was deferred to permanent status negotiations over "Jerusalem, settlements, specific military locations, and borders." .

Therefore, when Israel exercises administrative authority in Area C, it is not "stripping" the PA of powers it legitimately holds; it is exercising powers it never relinquished. The recent decision to transfer planning authority in Hebron and Bethlehem from Palestinian municipalities to Israel's Civil Administration is not a violation of Oslo but a reassertion of the legal status quo ante pending final status .

B. The Area C Jurisdiction
The Oslo II Accord divided the West Bank into three administrative zones:

• Area A: Full civil and security control by the PA.

• Area B: PA civil control, Israeli security control.

• Area C: Full Israeli control over security, planning, and territory.

Area C constitutes approximately 60% of the West Bank. Article XI of Oslo II explicitly grants Israel the authority to plan, zone, and register land in this area. The recent approval to register large areas of the West Bank as "state property" is a function of this reserved authority. The process is governed by existing Ottoman Land Law (1858) and Israeli military orders which empower the Civil Administration to register land as state land when private ownership cannot be proven. This is a routine administrative function, not a change to the political status of the territory .

II. MATERIAL BREACH BY THE PALESTINIAN SIDE AND THE DOCTRINE OF RECIPROCITY

International agreements operate on the fundamental principle of reciprocity. The Oslo Accords are replete with mutual obligations, particularly in the security sphere.

A. Security Commitments Under the Wye River Memorandum
The Wye River Memorandum (1998) represents the high-water mark of Palestinian security commitments. Under Section II ("Security"), the Palestinian side agreed to:

1. Outlaw and combat terrorist organizations systematically.

2. Apprehend and prosecute suspected terrorists.

3. Prohibit illegal weapons and implement a collection program.

4. Prevent incitement against Israel.

5. Maintain full, continuous security cooperation .

It is a matter of public record that these commitments have been systematically violated. Terrorist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operate openly in areas under PA jurisdiction. The PA has engaged in the practice of paying stipends to imprisoned terrorists ("pay-for-slay"), creating a direct incentive for violence. The 2023 attack, which initiated the current Gaza conflict, was facilitated by the failure of the Ramallah-based PA to control territory or disarm militant factions.

B. Legal Effect of Material Breach
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), while primarily governing treaties between states, provides customary international law principles applicable to these agreements. Article 60 of the VCLT provides that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles the other party to invoke that breach as grounds for suspending or terminating the agreement.
A "material breach" is defined as the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the treaty's object or purpose. The object and purpose of the Oslo Accords was "peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity, and security" . By harboring terror, permitting weapons proliferation, and failing to prevent the 2023 atrocities, the Palestinian side committed a material breach of such magnitude that it vitiates the foundation of the agreements. Consequently, Israel is legally entitled to suspend reciprocal performance, including restrictions on its administrative control in the West Bank.

III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER

The conflict that began on October 7, 2023, fundamentally altered the legal landscape. The attack was not merely a border skirmish but a large-scale, military-style invasion involving the massacre, kidnapping, and torture of civilians. This act of aggression triggered Israel's inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

A. Action Against Non-State Actors
It is a settled principle of modern international law that the right to self-defense applies to attacks by non-state actors operating from territory outside the effective control of a state. The UN Security Council, following 9/11, affirmed this principle in Resolutions 1368 and 1373. Where a territory (Gaza post-2005) is under the de facto control of a hostile non-state actor (Hamas) that refuses to abide by international law, the targeted state has the right to use force to remove the threat.

B. Necessity and Proportionality
Israel's military operations in Gaza, and its preventative security operations in the West Bank, adhere to the customary international law principles of necessity and proportionality.

• Necessity: The threat is existential and ongoing. Hamas has explicitly stated its intention to repeat the October 7 attacks. Over 100 hostages remain in captivity, and the recovery of their remains is a humanitarian obligation .

• Proportionality: Proportionality in self-defense does not require symmetry of force; it requires that the force used is not excessive relative to the threat. Israel's operations target military infrastructure, command centers, and terrorist operatives. The 2025 Gaza Peace Plan, involving phased ceasefire, hostage releases, and prisoner exchanges, demonstrates Israel's commitment to a peaceful resolution when security conditions permit .

IV. CLARIFYING THE CONCEPT OF "ANNEXATION"

Recent international criticism, including statements by Muslim nations and some media reports, has characterized Israel's West Bank measures as "illegal annexation" . This characterization is legally inaccurate.

A. Defining Annexation
Annexation is the formal, unilateral act by which a state asserts permanent sovereignty over territory. It is distinct from:

• Belligerent occupation: A temporary military administration pending a peace treaty.

• Administrative measures: Day-to-day governance, including land registration.

• Security barriers: Temporary measures to prevent terrorist infiltration.

B. Absence of Formal Annexation
Israel has not extended its civilian legal system to Area C (except for East Jerusalem, which was formally annexed in 1980 via the Basic Law). The actions in Hebron and Bethlehem involve transferring planning authority to the military's "Civil Administration," which is an organ of the occupation regime, not an extension of Israeli domestic law. This is a change in administrative competence, not an assertion of sovereignty. As the Israeli Supreme Court has consistently held, the West Bank is held under "belligerent occupation", and its legal status is subject to international law, not Israeli domestic law.

V. THE PARIS PROTOCOL AND ECONOMIC COORDINATION

The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (1994) established a customs union between Israel and the PA. While critics point to tax revenue transfers as a point of leverage, the legal framework supports Israel's cautious approach.

The Protocol, incorporated into Oslo II, establishes a mechanism for the transfer of VAT and customs revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the PA. However, these obligations are not unconditional. Where the PA uses funds to support terrorism (the "pay-for-slay" policy) or incite violence, Israel retains the right to set off such amounts. This is consistent with general principles of state finance and set-off in commercial law. Furthermore, the flow of funds to an entity that fails to control territory from which attacks emanate cannot be legally mandated without regard to the security of the collecting state.

VI. THE 2025 GAZA PEACE PLAN AND FUTURE OBLIGATIONS

The signing of the 2025 Gaza Peace Plan in Sharm el-Sheikh represents a critical juncture. This plan, endorsed by France and facilitated by the United States and regional mediators, establishes a new legal framework .

A. Shift from Oslo to Ad Hoc Agreements
The 2025 Plan implicitly recognizes that the Oslo framework has been overtaken by events. It provides for:

1. Hostage Release: The return of living hostages and remains.

2. Ceasefire: Phased cessation of hostilities contingent on performance.

3. Governance: The potential return of a "reformed" Palestinian Authority to Gaza, conditioned on disarmament of Hamas.

This framework reinforces the principle of conditionality. The PA's role in Gaza's future is explicitly tied to its willingness to confront terrorism and abandon violence. If the PA fails to meet these conditions, Israel retains the right to take necessary security measures.

B. International Legitimization
Crucially, the international community—including France, the United States, and Arab mediators—has endorsed this plan. France's statement welcoming the plan notes the need for "the disarmament and exclusion of Hamas" . This international consensus supports Israel's long-standing position that security must precede sovereignty, and that a state cannot be built while armed militias control territory. The plan also explicitly rejects "any annexation and any forced population displacement," aligning with Israel's stated position that it seeks negotiated borders, not unilateral imposition .

VII. RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN VIOLATIONS

Allegations of violations of private property rights under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) must be examined against the realities of armed conflict.

A. The "Military Necessity" Exception
The Hague Regulations (1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) prohibit the destruction of property except where "rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." This is not a blanket immunity for all property; it is a balancing test. Where buildings are used to store weapons, where tunnels are dug under civilian structures, or where command centers are embedded in residential areas, those structures lose their civilian immunity and become legitimate military objectives.

B. Combatting Tunnel Networks and Command Infrastructure
The conflict in Gaza has revealed an extensive military infrastructure built deliberately under hospitals, schools, and residential buildings. The destruction of such infrastructure, while tragic for adjacent property, is a lawful act of self-defense aimed at dismantling the capacity to launch future attacks. The party legally responsible for this destruction is the party that embedded military assets in civilian areas—Hamas—in violation of IHL's principle of distinction.

C. Temporary Seizure vs. Permanent Appropriation
Regarding land registration in the West Bank, it is critical to distinguish between the temporary seizure of property for military needs (permitted under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations) and the permanent appropriation of private property (prohibited). The registration of land as "state land" is a determination that the land is public domain (originally Ottoman or British crown land), not that private property is being permanently confiscated. This process is quasi-judicial and subject to appeal before the Israeli Supreme Court.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing legal analysis, the actions of the State of Israel are defensible under both the bilateral Oslo framework and customary international law.

1. Regarding Oslo: Israel has acted within the powers reserved to it regarding Area C. The Palestinian side's material breach of security obligations has suspended reciprocal performance.

2. Regarding Self-Defense: The October 7 attack triggered Article 51. Operations in Gaza and preventative measures in the West Bank are lawful exercises of this inherent right.

3. Regarding Annexation: Administrative measures regarding land registration and planning do not constitute annexation. No act of formal sovereignty has been extended, and the final status remains open for negotiation.

4. Regarding the Future: The 2025 Gaza Peace Plan provides a new, internationally endorsed framework. This framework conditions Palestinian governance on demilitarization and the rejection of terror, principles consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242 (land for peace) and the original mutual recognition of 1993.

The State of Israel remains committed to the goal of peace and a negotiated two-state solution. However, such a solution requires a partner committed to peace, not terror; to building, not destroying; and to coexistence, not annihilation. Until such a partner emerges, Israel retains the sovereign right and the duty to defend its citizens and administer the territory in accordance with law and security imperatives.