Western miscalculations and the existential reality of the Iran nuclear negotiations – analysis

The conclusion of five rounds of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States with no apparent progress appears to be a clear sign of a troubling reality – the gaps between U.S. stated positions and those of the Islamic Republic may be insurmountable by diplomatic means. 

An even more concerning fact seems clear from examining the statements of Iranian officials. It appears that the United States views the talks as an issue of ensuring regional stability, of minimizing and limiting conflict, and possibly an avenue of economic development, while the other key players involved – Iran and Israel – view Iran’s nuclear program as an existential issue. 

History of Iran’s nuclear program 

Iran’s nuclear program began under the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s, when the country was closely aligned with the United States and had friendly relations with Israel. 

In 1957, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S., the Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms, through the Atoms for Peace program, which led to the creation of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) two years later. 

In 1967, the United States supplied Iran with a 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, together with highly enriched uranium for fueling the reactor. 

The Shah had envisioned nuclear energy as an important component of modernizing Iran’s infrastructure and diversifying energy production. As part of that push, Iran joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and committed to oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By the mid-1970s, Iran had established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to oversee its program. 

However, after the overthrow of the Shah in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, nuclear cooperation with the United States came to a halt, and the new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, stopped the program, viewing it as a symbol of Western influence and wasteful spending considering the country’s substantial oil reserves. 

The Amad Plan 

However, after the Iran-Iraq war – and Israel’s successful bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 – Iranian leaders reconsidered that decision, believing that nuclear weapons could provide deterrence to its enemies. 

Iran restarted its nuclear program, acquiring necessary technology and materials on the black market, receiving significant assistance from Pakistan, which was also developing its own nuclear weapons program. Outwardly, the country maintained that it was only for peaceful purposes. 

In the early 2000s, the country’s covert nuclear program – the Amad Plan – was exposed, revealing violations of its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations by operating undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak. This research was being carried out despite statements by leading officials, such as then-President Mohammad Khatami, who in 2003 declared, “Iran’s nuclear program is purely for electricity generation and scientific research.” 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had issued a fatwa in 2003 – and reaffirmed it in 2010 – declaring nuclear weapons to be haram (forbidden) under Islamic Law. 

However, despite these statements, by 2010, Iran was already estimated to have enriched uranium to 20% purity, well beyond the 3 to 5% enrichment grade used in civilian energy and medical programs. Anything beyond 20% is considered highly-enriched uranium, and such enrichment is typically undertaken only by a nation pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. 

A negotiated agreement? The JCPOA 

In the 2010s, the U.S. engaged in negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The JCPOA was signed by Iran and the U.S., along with the United Kingdom., France, Russia, China, and Germany. The JCPOA was an attempt to curb Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief by the Western countries involved in the deal. 

At the time, President Hassan Rouhani said, “Our nuclear program is for energy and medical isotopes, ensuring our people’s prosperity without threatening others.” 

In 2018, after President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA imposing “maximum pressure” sanctions, Iran returned to producing highly enriched uranium. Then-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said in 2019, “We are exercising our right to advance nuclear technology due to America’s betrayal.” 

Still, the country has outwardly maintained that it is only interested in civilian uses for nuclear technology, with AEOI head, Mohammad Eslami, stating in 2023, “Our nuclear industry serves peaceful purposes – energy, agriculture, and medicine.” 

Israeli concerns 

However, some statements have cast doubt on Iran’s claims. In 2024, IRGC commander Hossein Salami stated, “Iran’s capabilities ensure our enemies’ destruction if provoked,” which many in Israel took to be a veiled threat regarding the Islamic Republic’s true goals for its program. 

Also, the 2018 Mossad operation, which led to the seizure of Iran’s “nuclear archive” from a Tehran warehouse, showed that Israel had legitimate reasons to be suspicious of Iran’s pledges to abide by the JCPOA. Those records revealed that Iran’s Project Amad had been conducted in secret, while Iran had claimed to be upholding the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

Israel’s opposition to the JCPOA also stemmed from the deal’s focus solely on nuclear enrichment, while ignoring related issues of concern, such as Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for terror proxies, especially Hezbollah and Hamas. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that due to the sanctions relief in the JCPOA, “Iran will get billions to fuel its terror machine.” 

Israel also opposed the “sunset” provisions in the deal, which would have removed enrichment restrictions by 2030, and ended most inspections five years later. In a 2015 speech to the UN, Netanyahu warned, “In 15 years, Iran will be free to produce as many bombs as it wants.” 

Trump withdraws from JCPOA 

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA in 2018 echoed many of the concerns long voiced by Prime Minister Netanyahu. After announcing the withdrawal, Trump also reimplemented pre-existing U.S. sanctions on Iran and began adding additional sanctions until the end of his term. 

Near the end of his term, Trump also authorized the January 2020 U.S. airstrike, which killed Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani – a key figure in Iran’s regional proxy strategy and believed to have some oversight of the nation’s nuclear program. The assassination of Soleimani was meant to demonstrate America's willingness to use military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 

However, the effects of the strike on Iran’s belligerence were not that clear. Iran carried out retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq, injuring over 100 soldiers, and also announced its intention to ignore the JCPOA enrichment limits. The departure of Trump later that month – and the arrival of the Biden administration – led to a shift in the U.S. strategy on Iran, marking a return to the foreign policy of the Obama administration in many ways. 

Trump had apparently hoped to combine the Soleimani strike with the Abraham Accords in order to bring about a shift in Middle Eastern alliances, building up a Sunni coalition aligned with Israeli interests to balance out Iran’s influence. 

As the Biden administration attempted to rejoin the JCPOA, Iran increased its uranium enrichment, reaching 20% purity at its Fordow site by January 2021. It also deployed advanced centrifuges, enabling the faster production of highly enriched uranium. 

These steps also came as the result of Israeli attempts to set back Iran’s nuclear program through sabotage operations, including an explosion at the Natanz nuclear site in June 2020, and the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh later that same year. 

These attacks were similar to a series of attacks and assassinations between 2005 and 2012, which were widely believed to have been carried out by Israel with covert U.S. support. Those attacks involved the Stuxnet cyberattack targeting Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility, along with the killing of at least five nuclear scientists between 2010-2012. 

These joint Israeli-U.S. attacks, which were considered a hint of a possible “military option”, along with sanctions and diplomatic efforts, were able to bring Iran to the negotiating table for the JCPOA. 

The unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA – and the imposition of a “maximum pressure” campaign with severe sanctions – convinced the Iranian government that it could not rely on the U.S. as a stable negotiating or treaty partner, due to the shifting policies of different administrations in the U.S. political system. 

Iran responds to JCPOA collapse 

Instead, these actions drove Iran to pursue methods of bypassing U.S. sanctions, caused it to limit IAEA inspections, and led to the Islamic regime ramping up its uranium enrichment in a retaliatory action. 

While the Biden administration tried to negotiate a return to the JCPOA, Iran had lost interest, and in the latter part of Biden’s term, it began warily watching the campaign of Donald Trump to judge his intentions, if he were to be reelected. In fact, Iran’s fears over possible military action, as well as a desire for revenge over the killing of Soleimani, appear to have been part of the motivation for the Islamic Republic to attempt to recruit willing assassins to remove the possibility of another Trump presidency. 

Trump 2.0 – A new deal? 

Since returning to the White House, Trump has sought to negotiate a new Iran deal, while holding the option of a military strike as a threat. The stationing of B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers in the Indian Ocean base of Diego Garcia, well within range of Iran’s nuclear sites, appears to be an attempt to convey Trump’s willingness to pursue such an option, even as he offers the chance of a new deal, which could possibly end the crippling sanctions. 

In his second term, President Trump appears to be prioritizing conflict reduction through economic deals, in a manner consistent with the plan laid out by his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, during his first term. 

Some political analysts believe that Trump is eager to achieve the Nobel Peace Prize, which he believes he deserves for securing the Abraham Accords. Whether this is true or not, it is clear that the economic focus of his first Middle East trip, which not only bypassed Israel, but failed to deal with several highly problematic aspects of U.S. relations with countries like Qatar, signaled to many, that Trump is less interested in military confrontations, preferring to achieve peace and stability in the region through the development of mutual economic interests. 

While this philosophy is particularly fitting for a businessman and real estate broker, the Middle East conflict zones fall largely along religious and idealistic lines, which have stubbornly resisted Western efforts to resolve. 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions 

Furthermore, it is not clear that Iran is being honest in its intentions about its nuclear program. Decades of warnings by former and current IAEA heads indicate that there have been serious concerns about Iran’s goals for its nuclear program for some time. 

Since the 2002 revelation of undeclared nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, the Iranian government has consistently restricted the access of IAEA inspectors to certain sites, leading the UN body in 2011 to warn of “credible” evidence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear development. Since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has further limited access to its nuclear sites. 

Already in 2005, after it became obvious that Iran had violated a 2003 agreement with the E3 (UK, France, Germany), IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei warned that the organization could not “conclude that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful without further cooperation.” 

In 2008, following evidence that Iran had enriched uranium over 3.5%, which is considered the ceiling of civilian-use uranium purity, in an IAEA Board of Governors report, ElBaradei warned, “We remain concerned about Iran’s past nuclear activities, including experiments with potential military applications. Iran must clarify these to build confidence.” 

This came amid reports that Iran was also conducting high-explosives tests needed to create a weapons-grade fission reaction. 

The next year, following the exposure of the Fordow facility and the revelation that Iran had enriched some uranium to 20% purity, ElBaradei again pointed to the agency’s concerns, stating, “Iran’s refusal to address military-related nuclear activities undermines trust.” 

Over the next four years, the agency continued to sound the alarm both about “activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device” and about “Iran’s lack of cooperation.” 

While warnings softened in the lead up to the implementation of the JCPOA, Amano warned that “verification is a long-term task. We must remain vigilant to ensure no diversion to military purposes.” 

After the breakdown of the JCPOA, the IAEA warnings became more urgent. 

In 2020, Director General Rafael Grossi stated, “Iran’s refusal to grant access to two undeclared sites where nuclear material was detected raises serious questions.” 

The next year, the Iranian parliament passed a law further limiting IAEA access to nuclear sites and began removing IAEA surveillance cameras that had been installed as part of the JCPOA. 

In 2021, Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo stated that Iran’s 20% and 60% enrichment levels “are unprecedented for a state without a declared weapons program,” saying the development “significantly increases proliferation risks.” 

In 2023, Grossi again sounded the alarm after uranium enriched to over 83% was discovered. 

“Finding 83.7% enriched uranium in Iran is a serious development. This is one step away from weapons-grade material, raising urgent questions about intent.” 

With no legitimate civilian need for uranium enriched to such a high purity, such warnings are not only clearly justified, they call into question the Iranian regime’s frequent declarations of innocent purpose. 

More recently, on May 17, 2025,  the IAEA report stated that Iran has amassed 408 kg (approximately 900 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60%. This represents a 50% increase in total highly enriched uranium since its February 2025 report. 

Rafael Grossi recently told the Financial Times that “Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon at this moment, but it has the material.” 

Over the years, Iranian leaders such as President Ahmadinejad have claimed their “nuclear program is transparent and peaceful,” while also stating, “We will not bow to pressure.” 

In a 2013 speech in Tehran, then-President Hassan said, “Iran’s nuclear program is a national right.” 

Later, after the U.S. departure from the JCPOA, in a televised address to the nation, Rouhani said that “if the West fails to honor it [the JCPOA], we will enrich uranium beyond limits. Our nuclear technology is our right.” 

In 2022, as Iran continued to exceed any civilian use for such highly enriched uranium, with around 150 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei referenced the 2003 fatwa (religious ruling), in which he had stated that “Nuclear weapons are against Islamic principles.” Khamenei claimed that the fatwa was still in force, despite increasing the country’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. 

More troubling, in 2024, IRGC Commander Hossein Salami told an IRGC rally that “Iran’s nuclear capabilities are a shield for our nation.” 

As recently as last week, Khamenei reiterated his country’s demand for enrichment, saying, “If we had 100 nuclear power plants while not having enrichment, they are not usable for us.” 

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that stance, stating, “We do not need anyone’s permission to enrich uranium.” 

These declarations of Iran’s “national right” to a nuclear program, and calling its capabilities “a shield for our nation,” call into question Iran’s commitment to a peaceful civilian program. 

That, along with the fact that Iran has consistently rejected any offer of a civilian nuclear program that does not involve enrichment, and the country’s past actions of hiding nuclear weapons development, means that Israel and the West have every reason to be suspicious of Iran’s honesty. 

In fact, it appears that both Israel and Iran share a common assessment of the Iranian nuclear program, with both viewing Iran’s nuclear program as an existential issue. For Iran, the lack of a nuclear weapon to provide a deterrent to Western meddling in its internal affairs is seen as an existential threat, while Israel views the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat to itself. 

Thus, in the current round of talks, it appears that the Trump negotiations are being conducted in an unbalanced way, with two radically different understandings of what is at stake. President Trump appears to be willing to use the threat of force, but has so far demonstrated little interest in backing that up with action, possibly fearing it could taint the peacemaker legacy he hopes to cement in his second term. 

Meanwhile, both Iran and Israel appear to share an assessment of the critical nature of Iran’s nuclear program, but with opposing interests. Thus, while Israel has currently given its assurances to the U.S. that it will not launch an independent strike on Iranian nuclear sites, the mismatch between Israeli and U.S. assessments of the situation, and the difference in the level of perceived existential threat, mean that an Israeli attack of some kind is practically an inevitability if the Iranian nuclear threat is not adequately dealt with. It's a reality that both Israel and Iran appear to be preparing for.