At the height of the war: Israel's socio-economic cabinet has not convened for a year

The State Comptroller’s report on the socio-economic cabinet was published this Tuesday. This cabinet was activated a few days after the Oct. 7th massacre, but has existed in previous governments as well.

Eight days after Oct. 7th, the government authorized the socio-economic cabinet to handle all civilian aspects related to managing the war effort – including education, health, welfare, economic assistance to business owners, and, of course, support for the hundreds of thousands of evacuees from their homes in the south and north.

The socio-economic cabinet exists in every government, but it was given special wartime authority a few days after the war broke out. All this happened against the backdrop of a deep economic crisis that preceded the war, which included a downgrade in Israel’s credit rating.

Because similar cabinets existed in previous governments, the comptroller was able to identify a worrying trend in how the current government treats this ministerial committee.

According to the State Comptroller’s Report, the average number of decisions made by the cabinet in the 30th government (2003–2006, Likud government under Ariel Sharon) was 52 per year. In the current government, from late December 2022 until the outbreak of the war in October 2023, only five decisions were made. That’s a 90% decrease.

From the establishment of the current government until the outbreak of the war, the cabinet held only one discussion. During the war – despite being authorized to address the urgent civilian issues mentioned above – the socio-economic cabinet did not convene at all for an entire year, from December 2023 to December 2024, precisely when the war was at its most intense and the number of evacuees was highest.

The cabinet made only four decisions related to the war: establishing the “Tkuma” (Rebirth) Directorate, granting property tax relief to residents of evacuated communities and recognized hostages, recommending the entry of Palestinian workers from the West Bank, and aligning criteria on that issue.

Even the civilian operations center (“Mashlat”) – meant to serve as an executive arm of the cabinet – failed and was shut down two and a half months after its establishment. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich responded to the audit’s findings in his reply to another report, stating: “The failure to establish the operations center and the limited activity of the socio-economic cabinet during the war are linked to the actions of professional bodies in the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission.”

According to Smotrich, these entities created significant obstacles to the establishment and operation of the operations center. He also said that he lacked sufficient authority to ensure the center’s proper establishment.

Similar Claims in Previous Reports

In September, the State Comptroller released another report regarding civilian management during the “Am KeLavi” (People of the Lion) War. That report also found there was no overarching government body coordinating the evacuation of residents whose homes were damaged. Instead, local authorities – under the direction of the National Emergency Authority (RAHEL) – were responsible for locating and housing evacuees in hotels.

Among evacuees, there was great uncertainty about when they would be required to leave the hotels, and they were often unable to find alternative housing arrangements in time. For example, one Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) family from Bnei Brak whose home was damaged and who were evacuated to a hotel in Herzliya were told to leave on the fast day of the 17th of Tammuz – without prior notice.

Another report submitted in early September, addressing the overall management of the home front during the war, held Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Finance Minister Smotrich personally responsible for several failures, including the failure to establish a central coordinating body, proliferation of uncoordinated telephone hotlines, and lack of a comprehensive civilian situational picture.