Over the past two years, Tehran tried to build a spy ring in Israel, similar to the Mossad's presence in Iran

Even before the start of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli police and Shin Bet security agents had uncovered an extensive effort by Iran to create an espionage network in the country. 

While investigations are still ongoing, according to indictments filed by prosecutors, over 30 Israelis have been accused of espionage for the Iranian regime since April 2024, when Iran first launched a ballistic missile attack on Israel. 

The indictments also reveal that most of the Israelis who performed acts of espionage were initially contacted via Telegram or other social media platforms. 

Recently, three Israelis were arrested and charged with carrying out missions on behalf of Iranian agents even during the recent Israel-Iran war. 

Two of the three are young men from the city of Tiberias, on the Sea of Galilee. Yoni Segal, 18,  and Omri Mizrahi, 20, had maintained contact with Iranian agents starting in May of this year, and ending only upon their arrest on June 15, two days after the start of the conflict. 

The pair were approached online by an Iranian agent pretending to be a “Kaplanist leftist” who asked them to write comments critical of the government or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then to film themselves setting fire to the messages. 

After completing those tasks, they were asked to do more serious jobs, such as gathering information about hospitals or shopping malls. They were paid NIS 1,000 (nearly $300) each to film videos documenting the locations and sending them to their handler, along with information about the placement and number of security guards. 

During their filming of the locations, the two sent their “live location” to the Iranian agent and even requested more assignments. By this time, both knew that they were working for Iranian agents. According to a report in Channel 12, the two even agreed to leave Israel for training in order to carry out an assassination against a high-ranking Israeli scientist. 

The two suggested traveling to Cyprus and then Turkey or Greece to meet with the Iranian agents, who had promised them $60,000 in cryptocurrency and offered to relocate their families to Iran if they completed the assassination. 

The third suspect arrested, Mark Morgain, 33, from the Jordan Valley, is suspected of being in contact with hostile intelligence elements during the month of June, including during the war, and carrying out various missions under the direct operation of the hostile element. 

Morgain allegedly agreed to place a grenade at a target with the intention of harming civilians, as part of a mission intended to harm Israel's security. He also sent videos of ballistic missile interceptions and impacts during the war. 

Often, those approached for recruitment had no idea initially that they were working for a hostile foreign agent. However, it quickly became apparent as the tasks shifted to more traditional intelligence and espionage acts. 

The indictments reveal that initial attempts at recruitment often offered payment for basic information. An example of a message posted by one agent was, “Do you have information about the war? We are willing to pay for it.” 

However, sometimes the messages were more direct. A message sent to an Israeli Arab read, “Free Jerusalem unites Muslims. Send us information about the war.” 

Those who responded were paid via online payment applications like PayPal or via cryptocurrency apps. 

After the successful completion of basic jobs, more sensitive tasks were assigned, including documenting security installations, IDF bases, Iron Dome batteries, and even the Military Intelligence headquarters in Glilot. 

Some of the sites documented by the recruits before the war became targets of Iranian ballistic missiles during the 12-day war with Iran, including the Haifa Port, the Nevatim Air Force Base, and the Weizmann Institute. 

In fact, although most of the individuals recruited provided little critical information, and most balked at carrying out more severe assignments, such as attacks on military installations or high-level assassinations, the authorities claim that Iran gathered higher quality data on certain locations by crowdsourcing the data. 

Israeli authorities estimate that the Iranian agents were too impatient in their attempts to escalate the types of assignments carried out by the recruits. While Israel spent years recruiting and training agents to carry out tasks in Iran, often tasking agents with carrying out assignments over months or years, the Iranian agents quickly moved from basic tasks like graffiti or taking photos, to asking the recruits to carry out terror-type attacks or assassinations. 

Over the past couple years, Israel Police and the Shin Bet have encountered an increased attempt by Iran to recruit Israelis for espionage activities. They have cautioned Israeli citizens to refrain from “engaging in contact with foreign operatives and carrying out tasks for them,” warning of harsh consequences for doing so.