The neighbour you must live with

Recognising a Palestinian state by fiat is not a policy; it is a posture. Symbolism is asked to discipline facts, as if naming a state would conjure the substance. That is theology, not analysis. States are not created by applause. They are built by a monopoly of force; by institutions that tax, adjudicate, restrain, and defend; and by leadership accountable to the governed. Where those elements are absent, the ceremony is counterfeit.

Oslo’s lesson was procedural, not romantic: peace earned by bargaining, not bestowed by proclamation. Mutual recognition was the hinge. The sequence mattered: negotiation first, recognition last. Reverse the order and you remove leverage. If the prize arrives regardless of conduct, conduct becomes irrelevant: the bill is paid before the meal, the tip automatic.

The present vogue abandons the tests of sovereignty. Gaza remains under a theocratic militia that uses civilians as armour. In Ramallah the presidency has outlived its mandate, and the public realm resembles patronage more than a republic. There is no chain of command, no monopoly on violence, no independent judiciary to discipline the powerful, and no fiscal system trusted by the taxed. These are not decorative complaints. They are the minimum criteria by which a polity becomes a state rather than an acronym.

The moral defence for recognition holds that symbols uplift and obligations civilise. It sounds humane and is untrue. Symbolism without enforcement breeds impunity. When offices and embassies float free of performance, moderates are not strengthened; they are made irrelevant. The message to rejectionists is plain: refusal pays.

Precedent matters. If the grisliest attack on Jews in a lifetime coincides with upgrades for those politically proximate to its authors, atrocity gains a reward. If persistent corruption is met with honours rather than audits, corruption becomes the rational choice. If Jerusalem is taught that concessions are unilateral and irreversible, trust becomes a luxury it cannot afford. Politics is a teacher; it teaches by what it pays for.

None of this absolves Israel. Governments in Jerusalem have confused tactical dominance with strategy and preferred coalition maintenance to planning. That is not a defence of ceremonial recognition. Serious policy restrains friends as well as enemies and ties outcomes to measurable behaviour. If a doctrine cannot survive that test, it belongs to public relations.

The alternative is prosaic. Recognition should follow verifiable conditions, not precede them: one authority that commands armed groups; a justice system with jurisdiction over officials as well as critics; transparent public finances subjected to audit; security arrangements that keep airports, schools, and markets beyond the reach of mortars. These are elementary standards for any neighbour.

It will be said that such criteria postpone justice. In truth they prevent fraud. Peace is not a blessing; it is a construction of habits that outlast press conferences, of borders that can be policed, and of budgets that can be defended to citizens who fund them. Where these are present, recognition confirms reality. Where they are absent, recognition evades it.

Reciprocity also matters. Oslo assumed each party could veto final settlement, compelling compromise at the table. Internationalising recognition dissolves that discipline and replaces mutual obligation with applause lines. The neighbour you must live with tomorrow is traded for an audience you will never meet.

The argument against ceremonial statehood is empirical. Where subsidies outran reform, institutions decayed. Where guns were not disarmed, politics became costume for militias. Where leaders were insulated from elections, rhetoric grew grander and results meaner. Pay for behaviour and you will get more of it. Pay for its opposite and you will get more of that.

A policy worthy of adults would make recognition conditional, cumulative, and reversible: conditional so each rung is earned by actions; cumulative so progress in one domain cannot excuse regression in another; reversible so incentives still bite after the photo call. Anything less is not peacemaking; it is the redistribution of risk from the arsonist to the neighbour.