Aerospace warfare in the Middle East and other developments

Hostilities against Israel since autumn of 2023 have demonstrated the effectiveness of aerospace combat advancements in the Middle East. The first operational use of the Arrow 3 was in November 2023, taking out a ballistic missile launched at Israel apparently by the Houthis [1]. Since then, hundreds of ballistic missiles have been fired at Israel, including intermittently from the Houthis and two barrages from Iran.

In late December 2024 Israel’s Ministry of Defense signed a deal with Israel Aerospace Industries to increase production of the Arrow 3 interceptor missiles [2]. The Arrow 3 is exo-atmospheric, meaning it is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles outside of earth’s atmosphere, technically in outer space [3].

The Houthis have used medium range ballistic missiles to strike Saudi Arabia since at least 2017 [4]. It is known that components for ballistic missiles are shipped from Iran to the Houthis [4] . In turn, the ballistic missiles are assembled and named according to type by the Houthis [4]. In September 2024, the Houthis launched at central Israel what they call a “Palestine 2”, claiming it to be a hypersonic ballistic missile [5]. The “Palestine 2” is equivalent to either the Iranian “Fattah 1” or Iranian “Kheibar Shekan 2” (KS-2) [6], which appear to have identical components. Iran is known to pursue multiple parallel paths in the research and development of weapons [7]. The KS-2 warhead is said to be made of advanced materials [8], which could be the difference between the two types. Advanced composite materials are lightweight thereby increasing missile range [8], and may have the effect of hindering radar detection and tracking [9].

The Fattah 1, unveiled by the IRGC in June 2023, is a two-stage ballistic missile, meaning after the main rocket engine has been used for propulsion and detached in midflight, instead of continuing its trajectory solely on momentum, there is a second stage rocket engine at the warhead/reentry vehicle [9]. This is the same type of rocket engine used by Iran to maneuver satellites into orbit [9]. While capable of significant maneuvers outside the atmosphere, it evidently is not capable of significant, sustained maneuvers within the atmosphere [9].

Similarly, the KS-2, introduced in late 2023 [8], is a two-stage solid fuel ballistic missile, and can be considered quasi-hypersonic [10]. A true hypersonic ballistic missile has a hypersonic glide vehicle, capable of maneuvering throughout flight especially within the atmosphere [11].

In November 2023, Iran unveiled the “Fattah 2” model, in which the warhead/reentry vehicle has a different design and specialized rocket engine, such that it appears to be a hypersonic glide vehicle [8]. It has close resemblance to the Boeing X-51 but designed with a liquid fueled rocket engine [8], instead of a scramjet engine. There are conflicting reports regarding the “Fattah 2”. As of November 2024, it was said that the Fattah 2 was still under development [8], however Iran claimed to have used the Fattah 2 among the 180 ballistic missiles launched at Israel on October 1 2024 [12]. While most of the ballistic missiles were intercepted, geolocated footage showed that a number of Iranian ballistic missiles made impact within Israel in that attack [12]. Israel’s military acknowledged impact at some airbases but asserted there was no effect to critical military assets or continuous operations [13]. The high number of ballistic missiles in the barrage suggests an attempt by Iran to overwhelm Israel’s automated defense systems. It is not known whether the impacts were from evasion of interceptors or that the defense systems selectively engaged incoming missiles that were tracking as a more significant threat.

The Arrow 3 has been operational since 2017 [14]. Features of Arrow 3 interceptors are hypersonic velocity, state-of-the-art maneuverability, and “hit-to-kill” technology [14], meaning that it does not carry explosives but destroys the target with a direct kinetic hit [15]. Arrow 3 interceptors are assembled in Israel, by Israel Aerospace Industries, but Boeing is responsible for 40-50% of the components [16]. Israel Aerospace Industries is one of Israel’s largest industrial companies and an important part of Israel’s economy [17]. While Israel’s Arrow 3 has the technological edge, there is some ambiguity regarding Iran’s aerospace developments with maneuverability, even as they pursue nuclear capability. It is conceivable that the Fattah 2 could be fitted as a nuclear weapon. Operational performance indicates that the Israeli Arrow 3 is superior to the U.S. THAAD system for intercepting ballistic missiles [18].

The Houthis, like the Iranians, have constructed extensive underground infrastructure in remote, rugged terrain [19], as bases and staging areas for far distance stand-off attacks [3]. Furthermore, the ballistic missile launchers are road-mobile and can be disguised as civilian trucks [20].

These stand-off tactics have proven to be a resilient and substantial threat. Normalization of Saudi Arabia with Israel involves security interests, as Iran and Iran-backed militant groups pose threats to Saudi Arabia [21], attributed largely to the Sunni-Shiite divide. Economic interests also are part of the normalization equation [21]. Saudi Arabia has immense oil reserves and is a major supplier of oil to the United States [21]. Even so, leadership of Saudi Arabia has been seeking to diversify sources of wealth [21]. Saudi Arabia has recently committed to investing hundreds of billions of dollars in the U.S., much of which is specifically for A.I. and “cutting-edge transformative technologies” [22]. That phrase is ambiguous terminology for technology associated with A.I. The countries of Qatar and United Arab Emirates likewise have security and economic interests. Qatar has been using mediation as a platform for international prestige [23]. The United Arab Emirates aspires to be the global leader in artificial intelligence (A.I.) in competition with Saudi Arabia [24].

The President of the United States’ trip to these countries appeals first and foremost to their economic wealth aspirations, and secondarily to military security. Though U.S. military hardware in general is considered superior, it is questionable what standing the POTUS has with these Arab countries militarily, given the unavailing military campaign on the Houthis, and the inability thus far to keep his word on bold statements and threats regarding Gaza and Iran. The framework for normalization is in place, and some sort of multilateral agreement, as in Daniel 9:27, is getting closer. In the United Arab Emirates, the POTUS concluded his trip by visiting the Abrahamic Family House, an interfaith complex for the religions of Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism as a center for the interfaith movement and religious pluralism. “Pluralism is more than just the sharing of certain values or agreement on some social issues…Pluralism has to do with lending credence to competing truth claims and accepting diverse beliefs regarding God and salvation.” [25] This is not a political issue, it is a spiritual issue!

On May 16, Israel carried out airstrikes on the Houthi-controlled seaports of Hodeidah and Salif, in Yemen [26]. Hodeidah is the main commercial port, handling imports of food, fuel, and supplies, and inflicting damage to port infrastructure is a humanitarian concern [27].

The IDF said in a statement that these ports are used for transferring weapons by exploiting civilian infrastructure [26]. The ports of Hodeidah and Salif have been used for smuggling weapons and their components [19]. Ballistic missiles are composed of sections that are smuggled in parts and assembled [19]. For Israel to attack the Houthis in Yemen, Israeli aircraft must fly over 1,000 miles, refuel in midflight at some point, and fly another 1,000 miles to round back to Israel [27].

As of May 19, there have been reports of GPS jamming to commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz [28]. This suggests that Iran has intentions of disrupting commercial shipping through that strait, as with the Houthis at the Bab el Mandeb Strait [28]. Coincidently, the Strait of Hormuz is the shipping route for Qatar and UAE, countries which the POTUS just recently visited. Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader of Iran has emphatically rejected the US stipulation of zero enrichment [29], which is a “red line” [30], indicating that the negotiations are at an impasse. It is reported that Israel is preparing to attack Iranian nuclear facilities [31]. Israeli Air Force F-35’s would likely have center role in attacking Iran’s nuclear program [32]. Israel has made enhancements to the US-supplied F-35’s, such as for weapons carriage capabilities [33]. Such an attack would likely be a lengthy campaign [32]. On May 23 in Rome, US and Iran had the fifth round of negotiations on a nuclear deal. The Mossad chief and the Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister are also in Rome, to be briefed by the US envoy immediately after the talks conclude [34].

At the island military base of Diego Garcia, several US Air Force aircraft have been deployed, including B-2 stealth bombers and several refueling tankers [35]. While some of the B-2 stealth bombers were returned to the United States, they were replaced with B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers [35]. Rotating in B-52’s suggests the necessity for higher payloads and that stealth is not a concern. The refueling tankers would be able to provide aerial refueling for both Israeli and US aircraft in the event of a coordinated campaign on Iran. Since April, US C-17 “Globemaster” military cargo planes have been making numerous flights into Nevatim air base in Israel delivering munitions at an unprecedented scale. While negotiations with Iran have gone nowhere, the talks have bought time for heavy military buildup in the region. These munitions probably are not for defensive combat, since Israel makes most of its automatic defense systems domestically.

Iran has reportedly been making preparations with air defenses [36], after losing significant air defense capabilities in Israeli attacks last year [32]. Iran has relied on the S-300 system from Russia, but in Israel’s attack on Iran in October, four S-300 batteries were destroyed. An S-300 battery consists of command-and-control unit, four launch vehicles, detection radar, and engagement radar [36]. Another S-300 radar was destroyed in Israel’s April 2024 attack [36]. As an alternative to the S-300, Iran has their domestically produced Bavar-373 system; the battery of a Bavar-373 is similar to an S-300 battery [36]. Any capable air defenses would likely be the first targets in the event of an attack. For Israel, the timing of an attack is an important factor as delay gives Iran more time to refortify its air defenses [32], and more time to advance its nuclear program. There are reports of disagreements between the POTUS and Israeli PM regarding Iran, with the POTUS insistent on a diplomatic solution [37]. Iran reportedly is having economic-related domestic issues, with truck drivers having launched a nationwide strike [38].

Ammonium perchlorate is the most common oxidizer for solid fuel ballistic missiles [19], and comprises about 70% of the propellant [39]. Other constituents include the binder, metal powder, stabilizers, curing agents, and burn-rate modifiers [40]. The constituents are intermixed in large mixers to a viscous slurry, which is poured into the rocket motor casing, and the loaded casing is then placed in a large oven for curing the propellant [40]. The casing is either high-strength steel or composite material; carbon-composite material is generally black, and silica phenolic material is yellowish [40]. The rocket motor casing functions both as storage for the propellant and as the combustion chamber when ignited, allowing for a more compact design [40]. Another advantage of solid fuel ballistic missiles is readiness, as the propellant is integral as manufactured [40]. Iran reportedly has recently ordered large quantities of ammonium perchlorate from China [39].

The Fattah 1, KS-2, and Palestine 2 -type ballistic missiles use the rocket motor casing, also known as the booster section, which is the main body of the rocket, of the Kheibar Shekan 1 (KS-1) design [41]; the KS-1 was unveiled in 2022 [42]. Dimensions are about 1 meter (about 3 ft) in diameter, and combined with the warhead/re-entry vehicle, about 15.3 m (about 50 ft) in length [41], and thereby fit on a semi-truck trailer. Based on appearance, the KS-1 and KS-2 are made of silica phenolic material with a carbon-composite nose tip. All of these specific types of ballistic missiles can be nuclear-armed [7]. An article by Defa Press, Iranian armed forces-run outlet, states Fattah-2 is still in development [43].

Attacking Iran’s nuclear sites would not be a one-off attack and reciprocal counterattack, but a war of repeated waves of attacks and counterattacks. Iran would launch quasi-hypersonic ballistic missiles at an unprecedented scale in the hundreds. The rate of launches would be limited by number of launchers and the time for reloading and restaging subsequent launch.

References

[1] Fabian, E. 2023, November 9. Israel’s Arrow 3 has made its 1st-ever interception, downing likely Yemen-fired missile. The Times of Israel.

[2] Fabian, E. and TOI Staff. 2024, December 24. Defense Ministry inks deal with IAI to expand supply of Arrow 3 missile interceptors. The Times of Israel.

[3] Rassler, D. 2024. Going the Distance: The Emergence of Long-Range Stand-Off Terrorism. CTC Sentinel.

[4] Defense Intelligence Agency. 2024. Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East.

[5] Agencies and TOI Staff. 2024, September 16. Sinwar congratulates Houthi leader on missile attack, says Hamas ready for long war. The Times of Israel

[6] Hinz, F. 2025. Made in Yemen? Assessing the Houthis’ Arms – Production Capacity. International Institute for Strategic Studies

[7] Eisenstadt, M. 2024. If Iran Gets the Bomb: Weapons, Force Posture, Strategy. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

[8] Shapira, B. 2024, November. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Crops – Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF). Alma Research and Education Center

[9] Nadimi, F. 2023, July The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles, Policy Note 138. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

[10] Portnoy, A. 2025. The Middle East and the Hypersonic Global Arms Race. Myths and Truth. The Blogs, The Times of Israel.

[11] Sayler, K. M. 2025. Hypersonic Weapons: Background Issues for Congress, Document R45811. Congressional Research Service.

[12] Braverman, A., A. Ganzeveld, K. Campa, C. Moorman, S. Kishore, K. Wells, R. Reddy, J. Moore, and B. Carter. Iran Update: October 1, 2024, Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET. Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project.

[13] AP and TOI Staff. 2024, October 3. Satelite imagery appears to show damage at air base after Iranian missile strike. The Times of Israel.

[14] Arrow Weapon System: The World’s Most Advanced Missile Defense System. 2022. Israel Aerospace Industries. MLM Division.

[15] Shapir, Y. 2013. Another Layer of Defense: The Arrow-3 Test, INSS Insight No. 407. The Institute for National Security Studies.

[16] Boeing Defense, Space & Security. 2013. Backgrounder: Arrow Weapon System.

[17] Matthew, D. and S. Mesilati. 2024. Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. Affirmed at ‘A-‘ on Strong Operating Performance; Outlook Stable. S&P Global.

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[21] Blanchard, C. M. 2024. Possible U.S.-Saudi Agreements and Normalization with Israel: Considerations for Congress, Document R48162. Congressional Research Service.

[22] May 13, 2025. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic $600 Billion Investment Commitment in Saudi Arabia. The White House.

[23] Guzansky, Y. 2025. The Qatari Challenge: Strategic Dilemmas and Policy Options for Israel, INSS Insight No. 1962. The Institute for National Security Studies.

[24] Fraioli, P. 2024. The UAE’s Technology Ambitions, INSS Strategic Comments Volume 30 Comment 23. The Institute for National Security Studies.

[25] What is Religious Pluralism? https://www.gotquestions.org/religious-pluralism.html, accessed May 06, 2025. Got Questions Ministries.

[26] Fabian, E. 2025, May 16. IDF confirms Yemen airstrikes, saying it destroyed infrastructure at Houthi-controlled ports. The Times of Israel.

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[33] Spencer, J. and L. Collins. 2025. How Israeli Military Technology Continues to Improve the US Military, INSS Insight No. 1975. The Institute for National Security Studies.

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[40] Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex Handbook 2017.

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[43] 2025, May 25. Iran at the Peak of Missile Fuel Technology: From Advanced Solid Propellants to Breakthroughs in Gel Fuel. Defa Press.